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Many governments seek to impose gender equality on boards, but the consequences of doing so
are not clear and could harm firms and economies. We shed light on this topic by conceptualizing
the relationships as firm- and board-specific and embedded within specific contexts. The theory is
developed with reference to emerging markets, and tested on Malaysian firms. We find that female
directors create value for some firms and decrease it for others. The impact varies across different
performance indicators, firms’ ownership, and boards’ structure. The findings call for nuanced
responses in relation to women’s nominations from both governments and firms. Copyright ©
2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Government authorities around the world are adopt-
ing policies designed to increase the participation
of women in firms’ boards. These policies are typi-
cally underpinned by the premise that women’s par-
ticipation has a positive impact on the functioning
of boards and subsequently on firms’ performance.
The theoretical and empirical evidence in support
of this premise, however, is inconclusive. Some
studies suggest that the diversity that women bring
to boards and their distinctive management style
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improve boards’ operation, whereas others note
that the limited experience of women in leadership
positions and their lesser drive to advance to the
top diminish their effectiveness as board mem-
bers (Dargnies, 2012). Parallel to this theoretical
ambiguity, the empirical evidence on the impact of
female directors on firms’ performance is mixed,
even in studies conducted in the same country
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar,
2012; Dezsö and Ross, 2012). This inconclusive
state of knowledge, at a time when governments are
introducing affirmative action policies that require
firms to nominate women to boards, is troubling,
making the understanding of the consequences of
women’s presence on boards timely and important.
We posit that the theoretical ambiguity and mixed
findings of extant research are indicative of the
complexity of the relationships between women’s
board participation and firms’ performance that
has not been fully accounted for. To comprehend
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this complexity, we develop a theory of value cre-
ation by female directors that extends existing the-
ory in two directions. First, we assign theoretical
meanings to performance indicators and conceptu-
alize them as revealing different institutional and
societal processes that determine the performance
outcomes. This conceptualization provides a the-
oretical underpinning for the anticipation that the
impact of female directors would vary across per-
formance indicators. Second, we maintain that the
processes that lead to women’s nominations and
determine the consequences of their presence hinge
on the characteristics of firms and their boards,
and hence the performance consequences of their
participation on boards are firm specific (Hillman,
Shropshire, and Cannella, 2007).
Our theory is developed in the context of emerg-
ing markets, and the impact of female directors
on performance is conceptualized as determined
by the corporate governance structure and the
societal attitudes towards gender equality in these
countries (Black, Jang, and Kim, 2006; Klapper
and Love, 2004; Morck, 2000). We believe ours
is the first study to examine—theoretically and
empirically—the relationships between women’s
board participation and firms’ performance in
emerging markets.
We test the theory on a data set of 841 Malaysian
firms that represent all Malaysian publicly listed
firms for which data were available in 2008. The
findings support the two pillars of our theory,
namely, the variations in the performance conse-
quences of female directors across different perfor-
mance indicators, and the firm specificity of these
relationships. These results are robust across dif-
ferent specifications and measures, increasing con-
fidence in their stability. We place Malaysia in a
comparative perspective with reference to cul-
ture and corporate governance structure, and use
this comparative approach to illustrate the broader
validity of the study. The paper concludes with
a discussion of the implications of the findings
for government policies and for firms deliberating
nomination of women to their boards.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Women’s participation on boards diversifies boards’
composition through the gender dimension. Their
inclusion modifies the logic of the major theories
that articulate the performance consequences
of board structure—agency theory (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976) and resource-dependency theory
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978)—in two ways. First,
women view themselves and their role in society
differently than men, and behave differently as
board members. Women’s perceptions of them-
selves influence their career choices and aspirations
and determine the magnitude and quality of the
pool of female candidates for board nominations
(Barbulescu and Bidwell, 2013). Second, firms’
stakeholders perceive women differently than they
perceive men and react differently to their presence
on boards. This affects the demand for female direc-
tors and the corporate environment they experience
as board members (Lee and James, 2007; Ryan and
Haslam, 2007). These aspects determine women’s
participation on boards and its impact on firms’
performance (Ding, Murray, and Stuart, 2013).
Both dimensions of gender impact are shaped
by the institutional context in which they take
place—notably, the nature of corporate governance
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Doidge, Karolyi, and
Stulz, 2007) and culture (Hofstede, 1998). Stud-
ies show that these contextual characteristics pos-
sess significant explanatory power for variations in
the gender profiles of boards across countries and
for their performance consequences (Terjesen and
Singh, 2008).
Our theory thus rests on the assumption that
the performance consequences of women’s partic-
ipation on boards are inextricably embedded in
an institutional context and reflect the configura-
tion of the institutional and cultural fabric of this
context. We set out to articulate the logic of this
institutional embeddedness in one setting that has
received limited attention by research in this area
thus far—emerging markets. For the purpose of this
study, we adopt an institution-based definition of
emerging markets. This definition is appropriate for
our study because the institutional environment is a
major determinant of the relationship we study. The
theory we develop is grounded in the nature of the
institutional environment and cultural perceptions
that prevail in these countries.
We begin by outlining a rationale for anticipating
differences in the impact of female directors on
performance in emerging markets, distinguishing
between accounting and market performance.
Extant research conducted in developed countries
treated these performance indicators as differ-
ent operation measures of the same theoretical
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constructs and suggested that they make lit-
tle difference for the outcomes (Dalton et al.,
1998). We challenge this suggestion and main-
tain that these indicators represent theoretically
different venues of value creation by female
directors. Accounting performance, which reflects
women’s actual performance as board members,
is indicative of the magnitude and quality of the
pool of female candidates and the likelihood
of their nominations as board members. Mar-
ket performance, in turn, reveals the prevailing
attitudes toward women in a society and the
perceptions of their role in business.
There are several reasons for anticipating that
the participation of women on boards of emerg-
ing market firms will exercise a positive impact on
accounting performance. First, women’s excellence
in establishing relationships and in collaborative
work is of high value for the group work that char-
acterizes boards’ activity (Dargnies, 2012). Women
also tend to excel in monitoring activities and
to hold management accountable for performance
more firmly than their male counterparts (Triana,
Miller, and Trzebiatowski, 2014). We suggest that
these behavioral attributes are of particular value in
emerging markets. Research shows that the impact
of monitoring on performance is most valuable
when corporate governance systems are weak or
nonfunctioning (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), which
is often the case in emerging markets. The absence
of external mechanisms to monitor management,
such as the market for corporate control, further
accentuates the value of women monitoring capa-
bilities (Morck, 2000). Studies of emerging market
firms show that the presence of female directors
on boards is negatively related to earnings manage-
ment and accounting manipulation, and positively
affects the informativeness of the reported account-
ing numbers (Abdullah and Ku Ismail, 2013).
Second, the career aspirations of women often
result in different occupational profiles than men
(Barbulescu and Bidwell, 2013), and as a result
their presence on boards increases the diversity
of functional background. Substantial research on
developed country firms acknowledges diversity
as an important determinant of boards’ function-
ing because it connects firms to diverse external
resources. Board diversity is likely to be of partic-
ular value in emerging markets, because it mirrors
the high levels of diversification typical of emerg-
ing market firms. Diversified firms are subject to
the demands of multiple and diverse environmental
dependencies and need varied capabilities to man-
age them (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Women
directors are particularly effective in connecting
firms with resources controlled by women, and in
helping them attract and retain female employees
(Hillman et al., 2007). This is likely to be of consid-
erable merit in emerging markets, where the gender
divide often inhibits the ability of male directors to
effectively connect with women.
Third, drawing on the female portion of the popu-
lation, which is often excluded from the pool of can-
didates for board nominations, is likely to improve
the quality of board members. Excluding segments
of the population on discriminatory grounds is
costly for firms, particularly when the excluded
groups are large, as is the case for women (Ding
et al., 2013). The board participation of women
in emerging markets is 7.4 percent, well below
11.8 percent in developed countries (GMI, 2013).
It also lags far behind women’s education achieve-
ments and their performance in the labor market.
The potential benefits of drawing on this group
are thus particularly notable in emerging markets
(Siegel, Pyun, and Cheon, 2011). Formally:
Hypothesis 1: The participation of women on
the boards of emerging market firms positively
affects accounting performance.
There are several grounds for anticipating that the
market reaction to female directors will be unfa-
vorable, resulting in a negative impact on market
performance. Most societies view women in top
managerial positions unfavorably (Hofstede, 1998),
and these views are pronounced in relation to board
positions that are associated with power, author-
ity, and control—attributes that are decidedly mas-
culine. Such societal perceptions often override
judgment of actual performance, leading to market
reactions that bear no relation to actual performance
(Lee and James, 2007). The negative views of
women on boards are likely to be marked in emerg-
ing markets, shaped by deeply rooted unfavorable
attitudes toward women in positions of power.
Further, the low participation of women on
boards reduces and may eliminate precedents on
which to evaluate the likely outcome of their pres-
ence. This increases the perceived risk associated
with their nominations, which are therefore dis-
counted by risk-averse investors (Lubomir, More-
ton, and Zenger, 2012). As noted, female directors
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in emerging markets are scarcer than in developed
countries (GMI, 2013), and this scarcity accentuates
the risk associated with their nominations. Emerg-
ing market investors tend to be highly risk averse
because investors’ protection is usually weak in
these countries (Morck, 2000). These investors are
likely to be particularly hostile towards the presence
of female directors.
A market bias against women on boards is likely
also because the majority of investors are men,
and they tend to have stereotypically negative per-
ceptions of women in top managerial positions.
Bigelow and Parks (2006) found that U.S. male
investors are willing to invest three times more
money in male-led firms than in female-led firms.
The dominance of male investors that propels such
attitudes is more apparent in emerging economies
than elsewhere. Formally:
Hypothesis 2: The participation of women on
boards of emerging market firms negatively
affects market performance.
MODERATING EFFECTS: FIRM AND
BOARD ATTRIBUTES
The characteristics of firms and their boards deter-
mine the likelihood of nominations of women and
the criteria used in their selection. They also shape
the corporate governance environment in which
female directors operate and their ability to influ-
ence boards’ functioning and firms’ performance.
Hence, the impact of female directors on account-
ing and market performances is likely to be contin-
gent on the characteristics of firms and their boards
(Hillman et al., 2007). Notable among these charac-
teristics are the identity of firms’ owners, whether
government, family, or widely held; the degree
of ownership concentration; and the structure of
boards. We use the term “widely held companies”
to refer to companies whose controlling shares are
dispersed among the public rather than held by fam-
ilies or the government.
There are several reasons for anticipating that the
impact of female directors on accounting and mar-
ket performances will be weaker in government-
and family-owned firms. For one, risk-averse and
conformist family- and government-owned firms
are less likely to nominate women because such
nominations represent a deviation from societal
norms and are high-risk moves (Lubomir et al.,
2012). The reluctance to nominate women deprives
family- and government-owned firms from the
potential economic benefits of female directors
(outlined in Hypothesis 1). To the extent that such
firms nominate women, they exhibit preference for
nominations from within their circles as a means of
reducing risk. Such relationship-based nominations
are accentuated in emerging markets, where busi-
ness relationships are affected by personal relation-
ships to a greater extent than in developed countries.
Boards managed by large numbers of group mem-
bers often pursue firm-specific agendas that deviate
from shareholders’ interests and are viewed unfa-
vorably by shareholders, negatively affecting mar-
ket performance. This argument may not hold when
ownership is tightly concentrated such that the inter-
ests of the few large owners who nominated the
boards are closely aligned.
Governments’ affirmative action policies may
also affect the performance impact of female direc-
tors. Government-owned firms are usually under
stronger pressure to conform to these policies,
resulting in a greater prevalence of female directors
on their boards. The pressure on government-owned
firms tends to be stronger in emerging markets
where governments are usually more involved in
the management of the firms they own. As evi-
dence from Norway suggests, legislation-imposed
nominations often result in nominations of
lesser-qualified women, lowering the quality of
female directors and diminishing their positive
impact (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). Formally:
Hypothesis 3: Compared with widely held
ownership, family and government forms of
ownership negatively moderate the relationships
between the participation of women on boards
of emerging market firms and (a) accounting
performance, and (b) market performance.
The second ownership attribute that is likely
to moderate the impact of female directors on
performance is ownership concentration. As noted
earlier (Hypothesis 1), women tend to excel in
monitoring, a behavioral attribute that is likely to
be valued by large shareholders whose large stake
in the firm increases their incentives to monitor
its activities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Hence,
they are likely to create an environment that is
conducive for women directors to assert themselves
and make an impact. Small shareholders are also
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likely to place a premium on women’s monitoring
skills under conditions of concentrated ownership,
because they increase transparency and protect
small shareholders from the large controlling
shareholders who often use their power to manip-
ulate information and diminish its availability
and reliability. Studies of emerging market firms
show that the concentration of ownership is sig-
nificantly and positively associated with earnings
management.
Furthermore, the conflict of interests between
managers and shareholders typical of diffused own-
ership tends to be lessened and might be eliminated
when ownership is concentrated. Thus, high con-
centration creates a corporate environment that is
more conducive for women exhibiting their ten-
dencies for consensus and conflict avoidance. The
moderating impact of ownership concentration is
likely to be notable in emerging markets, where
the levels of ownership concentration are very high
(Morck, 2000). The actual power of the large share-
holders tends to be greater than their equity own-
ership indicates, due to the complicated pyramidal
and cross-holding structures prevalent in emerging
markets. Hence:
Hypothesis 4: The concentration of ownership
positively moderates the relationships between
the participation of women on boards of emerg-
ing market firms and (a) accounting perfor-
mance, and (b) market performance.
In addition to firm ownership, the impact of
female directors on performance is likely to be con-
tingent also on boards’ structure, notably the iden-
tity of its members and their independence. Of the
multiple identity threats, ethnic diversity appears
to be particularly impactful in the highly diverse
emerging markets. Ethnicity shapes people’s view
of the world, including their attitudes towards gen-
der equality, and it is likely to also affect the nom-
ination processes of women and the nature of their
board participation.
Ethnically diverse boards are more likely to
create an environment in which the diversity that
female directors bring is welcomed and viewed
favorably. Moreover, nominations of ethnically
diverse boards tend to be based on candidates’
qualifications and result in a more ethnically diverse
female body that mirrors the ethnic diversity of
firms’ stakeholders. These attributes of ethnically
diverse boards are likely to accentuate the positive
impact of female directors on accounting perfor-
mance. Shareholders tend to believe that ethnically
diverse boards are more attentive to diverse needs
and better protect their interests, and hence view
favorably boards’ gender diversity. Formally:
Hypothesis 5: Boards’ ethnic diversity positively
moderates the relationships between the partici-
pation of women on boards of emerging market
firms and (a) accounting performance, and (b)
market performance.
We anticipate that boards’ independence will also
moderate the impact of female directors on per-
formance. Free of the demands of close relation-
ships with management, independent boards tend
to monitor management closely and, in doing this,
instill an environment whereby women’s monitor-
ing ability can be impactful. Independent boards
are also more likely to nominate independent direc-
tors, a tendency that has a particular impact in rela-
tion to women. Research conducted in developed
countries shows that the exclusion of women from
the “old boy networks” often entails that they tend
to be more closely aligned with the concept of
independent directors (Adams and Ferreira, 2009).
We believe similar patterns are likely to be appar-
ent in emerging markets, because the wide gen-
der divide excludes women’s participation in men’s
networks. Shareholders value board independence
because such boards better protect their rights, a fea-
ture that is of particular value when the legal protec-
tion of minority shareholders is weak or nonexistent
(Morck, 2000). Formally:
Hypothesis 6: Boards’ independence positively
moderates the relationships between the partici-
pation of women on boards of emerging market
firms and (a) accounting performance, and (b)
market performance.
METHOD
The empirical testing is based on a dataset of
841 firms listed on the Main Board in Bursa
Malaysia for which data were available in 2008
(Appendix A, File S1). Malaysia provides an inter-
esting context for our study. It is notable among
emerging countries in its commitment to promote
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women in business, including on boards, and has
made considerable strides in advancing women.
As part of these gender promotion initiatives, the
Malaysian government issued strong recommen-
dations to Malaysian firms to appoint 30 percent
women at the decision-making levels, the first Asian
government to do so, pioneering among emerg-
ing markets. Malaysia thus provides a rich con-
text for the study of the performance consequences
of female directors in emerging markets. Further,
Malaysia represents a corporate governance con-
text that is common in several emerging markets,
but is somewhat unusual in a global perspective.
This provides a distinct context for our study, and
affords the opportunity for theoretical extensions.
Lastly, Malaysia is interesting also in relation to
gender equality. It is notable in its institutional com-
mitment to gender equality and the advancement
of women, and at the same time deeply rooted
cultural resistance to women’s progression. This
combination provides an interesting setting for
observing the interplay between societal and insti-
tutional attributes in affecting the relationships we
study. Appendices B and C in File S1 present
Malaysia in a comparative perspective in relation
to governance structure and gender equality and
illustrate these features.
Data for the empirical analyses were collected
from firms’ annual reports, supplemented by
DataStream (for the performance indicators) and
Bursa Malaysia. Table 1 presents the variables in
the model, their operation measures, descriptive
statistics, and Pearson coefficients.
Endogeneity might drive the relationships
between performance and women’s nominations,
and that would violate the causal relationships we
assume between them. We recognize this issue, but
believe that our study design and data reduce endo-
geneity concerns and hence do not correct for it in
the analysis. Our measure of the presence of women
on boards represents cumulative nominations over
time, whereas the performance indicators are at one
point in time. This introduces a time lag between
women’s appointment and firms’ performance
and removes the potential for reverse causality.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence in support of
endogeneity between performance and women’s
presence on boards is mixed and inconclusive. The
stability of our results across different estimates
(reported in the next section) is also reassuring of
the causality direction we assume.
We also note some theoretical reasons for assum-
ing that, in the context we study, the prevalence
of female directors is exogenous to performance.
The legitimacy effect that board nominations of
women is maintained to provide in the United States
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Hillman et al., 2007)
does not seem to hold in emerging markets. Asian
firms refrain from publicizing their women nomina-
tions to avoid alienating their stakeholders (Siegel
et al., 2011). In addition, firms’ tendency to engage
female directors who are family members or asso-
ciated with the government, common in emerging
markets and Malaysia, is driven by the intention
to protect the interests of the controlling owners.
These concerns override performance considera-
tions and deter the association between the two.
Almost half of the female directors of the firms we
studied have family relationships with board mem-
bers (Appendix D, File S1).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The hypotheses are tested based on an ordinary
least squares multiple regression with a hierarchical
modeling procedure (Table 2). The findings show
that, before accounting for the moderating effects,
Malaysian firms that have at least one woman on
their boards have higher return on assets (ROA)
and lower Tobin’s q than those that have none.
Both effects are statistically significant, in support
of Hypotheses 1 and 2. These findings suggest that
female directors create economic value, but the
market discounts their impact.
The conflicting results for the two performance
indicators are informative of the different ways
by which societal attitudes towards women affect
the relationships we study, and provide support for
the varying connotations we assign for different
performance measures.
The positive results for Hypothesis 1 are indica-
tive of the benefits accrued to firms recruiting
Malaysia’s large pool of underutilized female can-
didates. The majority of students in Malaysia uni-
versities are women; yet, more than half of the firms
we studied did not have any women on their boards,
and one-third had only one woman (Appendix E,
File S1). The negative impact of female directors in
the Tobin’s q analysis (Hypothesis 2) is indicative
of the unfavorable views of women in positions of
power common in Malaysia.
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Table 2. Model estimates: regression coefficients (t−values)
ROA Tobin’s q
Dependent variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Women (0/1) [H1, H2] 0.16 0.15 −0.24 −0.15 −0.13 0.05
(2.42)** (2.27)** (−0.85) (−2.18)** (−1.94)* (0.18)
Ownership: family −0.12 0.001 −0.17 −0.10
(−0.23) (0.01) (−2.13)** (−0.87)
Ownership: government −0.19 0.16 0.03 0.30
(−1.26) (0.30) (0.19) (1.40)
Ownership concentration 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.004
(5.36)*** (3.01)*** (1.75)* (1.42)
Board ethnic diversity −0.08 −0.03 0.02 0.07
(−0.42) (−0.16) (0.11) (0.29)
Board independence −0.14** −0.20** 0.001 0.09
(−2.15) (−2.39) (0.01) (1.00)


















Board size 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
(4.44)*** (4.05)*** (3.45)*** (3.29)*** (1.18) (1.49) (1.49) (1.57)
Firm size 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06
(3.66)*** (3.71)*** (3.29)*** (3.50)*** (2.34)** (2.31)** (1.90)* (2.13)**
Board age 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.01 −0.02** −0.01 −0.01
(0.99) (1.26) (1.26) (1.07) (−1.90)* (−2.14) (−2.04)** (−1.94)*
Finance −0.47 −0.50 −0.44 −0.48 0.71 0.74 0.70 0.70
(−2.14)** (−2.27)** (−2.01)** (−2.18)** (3.19)*** (3.31)*** (3.18)*** (3.09)***
Industrial products 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.17 −0.04 −0.04 −0.03 0.03
(1.20) (1.16) (1.23) (1.04) (−0.27) (−0.22) (−0.17) (−0.19)
Consumer products 0.41 0.40 0.36 0.34 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.23
(2.39)** (2.33)** (2.11)** (1.98)** (1.23) (1.29) (1.28) (1.33)
Trade and services 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.22 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.34
(1.29) (1.23) (1.53) (1.32) (2.03)** (2.09)*** (2.02)** (1.98)**
Property −0.01 −0.04 0.01 −0.02 −0.43 −0.40 −0.38 −0.40
(−0.06) (−0.22) (0.05) (−0.11) (−2.37)** (−2.23)** (−2.07)** (−2.20)**
Construction −0.23 −0.22 −0.21 −0.23 0.40 0.39 0.42 0.42
(−1.14) (−1.10) (−1.09) (−1.17) (2.00)** (1.97)** (2.12)** (2.10)**
Plantation 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.29
(4.09)*** (4.15)*** (4.20)*** (4.15)*** (1.37) (1.32) (1.44) (1.34)
Constant −2.42 −2.55 −2.82 −2.63 −0.367 −0.25 −0.33 −0.46
(−5.30)*** (−5.56)*** (−6.04)*** (−5.45)*** (−0.80) (−0.54) (−0.70) (−0.93)
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
F-statistic 10.73*** 10.34*** 9.56*** 7.59*** 9.02*** 8.67*** 6.51*** 5.27***
Na 841 841 841 841 840 840 840 840
a The Tobin’s q analyses have one less firm because market capitalization was not available for one firm.
*p< 0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.0
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The significant results of Hypotheses 1 and 2
should be evaluated in light of the small numbers of
women on the boards of Malaysian firms (Appendix
E, File S1). Research suggests that the number of
female directors has to reach a tipping point, iden-
tified to lie between 10 and 30 percent of directors,
in order for it to be noticeable (Kogut, Colomer, and
Belinky, 2014; Konrad, Kramer, and Erkut, 2008).
Only a few of the firms we studied pass these thresh-
olds (Appendix E, File S1). It could be that in a soci-
ety that discriminates against women in leadership
positions, the women that reach the top are particu-
larly able, and their presence on boards has a signif-
icant impact, even when in small numbers. Studies
of developed countries find that board participation
requires women to be more accomplished than men,
to compensate for gender bias in board nominations.
It is likely that such a gender effect is pronounced
in a country like Malaysia. Indeed, at the time of
our study, more than half of the female directors in
Malaysia held university degrees, and 15 percent of
them held graduate degrees (Appendix D, File S1).
The impact of women on both performance mea-
sures turns insignificant with the introduction of
the moderating variables, which suggests that this
impact is captured via these moderating effects, in
support of the firm specificity of the relationships.
The impact of female directors on performance is
significantly moderated by firms’ ownership char-
acteristics, whereas the characteristics of the boards
do not influence these relationships.
Government ownership is significant with both
performance measures and in the anticipated neg-
ative direction (Hypothesis 3a, b), in agreement
with our theory. Family ownership is insignifi-
cant in either analysis, perhaps reflecting similarity
between Malaysia’s family-owned and widely held
firms. Both groups of firms are owned and managed
by the Malaysian Chinese and share many common
characteristics. The moderating effect of ownership
concentration is positive and significant in the ROA
analysis, and insignificant in the Tobin’s q analy-
sis. The nonsignificant results might be interpreted
as suggesting that Malaysia shareholders believe
that, under conditions of concentrated ownership,
women are nominated to boards because they are
less powerful and less able to exert control over
the large, powerful shareholders. Hence, the market
interprets their presence as lacking significance, in
agreement with our findings.
A possible explanation for the insignificance of
ethnic diversity could be the ethnic homogeneity
of the boards of many Malaysian firms. The high
ethnic diversity that characterizes Malaysia is not
mirrored in the governance structure of Malaysian
firms. Government-owned firms are for the most
part governed by the Malaysian Malays, and other
firms are controlled and managed mostly by the
Malaysian Chinese. In part, this is a result of an
affirmative action policy pursued by the Malaysian
government to ensure the representation of the
Malay community in the business sector.
The insignificance of the moderating effect
of board independence on either performance
indicator might be due to the fact that in Malaysia,
as in many other emerging markets, independent
directorship is a concept deprived of its actual
meaning. Firms nominate directors that fulfill
the legal definition of independence but are close
to the management and act in the interest of the
controlling shareholders. Nor are such independent
boards more likely to nominate female directors as
our theory suggests (Abdullah, 2014).
It might also be that the nonsignificance of board
characteristics is revealing of some interactions
between boards’ and firms’ characteristics, such
that their moderating effects are exercised jointly.
Testing of the combined effect of firms’ owner-
ship and board structure provided support for this
suggestion, indicating that the moderating effects
of firms’ ownership and the ethnic diversity of
their boards are exercised together. The results of
these analyses are available from the authors upon
request. We conducted several additional tests to
examine the robustness of our conclusions to dif-
ferent measures and specifications (see Appendix
F, File S1 for the results and discussion). There
are minor changes in the magnitude of some coef-
ficients but the general conclusions continue to
hold in these modified specifications. The compar-
ative data in Appendices B and C, File S1 enable
us to evaluate our findings in broader perspective
and examine their validity beyond Malaysia. Lim-
itations of the study and suggestions for future
research are discussed in Appendix G, File S1.
CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we sought to deepen the understand-
ing of the impact of female directors on firms’
performance. Our findings make three important
contributions to the theory on the performance
consequences of female directors on boards. For
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one, they show that this impact manifests in con-
flicting directions, positively affecting accounting
performance and negatively influencing market per-
formance. This suggests that female directors are
subject to a biased evaluation by the market, which
undervalues their presence on boards. The conflict-
ing results of the two performance indicators speak
for the importance of assigning theoretical mean-
ings to performance indicators and treating them as
indicative of different contextual characteristics that
affect outcomes in different ways.
The variations we find in the impact of female
directors on performance across firms with different
ownership types and structures is another important
contribution of the study, which serves to deepen
the understanding of the firm-specificity of the
relationships and to identify some of the salient
moderating effects. The significant results show that
the performance consequences of female directors
cannot be understood without accounting for the
contingency effects that shape them.
Lastly, the study advances the understanding of
the impact of female directors in emerging mar-
kets, extending our knowledge of the institutional
and cultural characteristics that shape this outcome.
The focus on a single emerging economy enables
us to ground the major theoretical constructs that
shape the relationships of interest within a context
and conceptualize them as socially constructed and
context specific. In doing this, we offer a theoreti-
cal underpinning for the anticipation of the impact
of institutional and societal dimensions on the out-
come, and suggest that the performance impact of
female directors is likely to be contingent on these
dimensions (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Doidge
et al., 2007). The study of the performance conse-
quences of gender diversity of boards, as one dimen-
sion of boards’ structure, in emerging markets is of
notable merit. The weak institutional environment
typical of these countries and the absence of exter-
nal mechanisms of corporate control of the type
common in developed countries heighten the value
of the internal control function exercised by boards.
These institutional circumstances also foster con-
siderable variations in governance practices, turn-
ing them into an important determinant of firms’
performance and market value.
The study offers several important lessons for
practice. The conflicting impact of female direc-
tors on accounting and market performances pro-
vides support for women’s board nominations but
also suggests that the response of the market could
hinder the benefits associated with their participa-
tion. Government policies should be formed with
recognition of this trade-off. Firms considering the
nominations of women to their boards should also
be aware of it. The firm specificity of the relation-
ships calls for nuanced responses to women’s board
nominations from firms and policymakers. Gender
quotas imposed equally might benefit some firms
but could be inappropriate for others. Firms consid-
ering the nominations of women should carefully
examine the level of women’s involvement that is
adequate for them.
Further, our theory and interpretation of the find-
ings suggest that context plays a role in shaping
the impact of female directors on performance. This
suggestion, which has to be verified in a multicoun-
try study, indicates that the desired level of gender
equality on boards might be country specific. Intro-
ducing affirmative action policies based on experi-
ences of other countries, as some governments do,
could be inappropriate. Firms should also consider
the value of female directors with reference to the
characteristics of the context in which they operate.
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in the online version of this article:
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